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ABSTRACT
This paper constructs a game theoretical model of the N.E.P. (New
Economic Policy, 1921-1930) in the Soviet Union. The N.E.P. is modeled as a
cooperative income redistribution game, whose solution concept is the
Shapley value. Special attention is paid to the connection between politi
cal power, as measured by party strength, and economic power, inversely
related to the taxation rate. The equation relating peasant party strength
and the state grain procurement rate is fitted for the available data, 1925-
1930. The model shows clearly the relationship between falling political
power of the peasants and the rising rate of grain procurement by the state
that were hallmarks of the N.E.P. The aftermath of the N.E.P. is inter
preted in light of these results.
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Thanks to the pathbreaking work of Bettelheim, scholars now take
seriously the notion of class struggle in the U«S.S»R- The peasant struggle
for power makes the period of the New Economic Policy (N.E»P»), 1921—1930,
unique in Soviet history. Unlike the preceding period. War Communism, the
N-E.P, saw no direct requisition of grain by the state, although the threat
of such requisition lingered# Instead, the state allowed a free market for
grain and met its needs by open market purchases. Markets were active on a
scale never seen before or since in the Soviet economy. At the same time,
the style of party decision- making was relatively more open than during the
Civil War. In fact, the decision to implement the N.E.P., taken by the
Tenth Party Congress (1921), was the result of a majority vote.^ There was
for a time considerable room for policy disagreement within the party,
although this was to change drastically by the thirties.
The N.E.P. was, however, also a period of social upheaval and contra
dictory tendencies. Although the basic principle of the' N.E.P. was the
peasant-worker alliance, considerable tension arose between these two
classes concerning major distributional questions - namely, party membership
and income. In a one-party state, party membership and control had signifi
cant distributional consequences. This tension manifested itself during the
.course of the industrialization debate. Proponents of more rapid industri
alization argued for the abandonment of the N.E.P., while proponents of the
N.E.P. argued for a moderate rate of industrialization. The ultimate poli
tical victory of the former meant not only the end of the N.E.P., but also
the political defeat of the peasants. Two important indicators of these
contradictory tendencies were the falling ratio of peasants in the party and
the rising rate of government grain procurement, especially after 1927.
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What this paper argues is that these, far from being isolated tendencies,
were rather intimately linked features of the Soviet redistribution system.
The fall in the political power of the peasants led to the fall in their
economic power, as signaled by the rising state grain procurements. The
abandotment of the N.E.P. and the promulgation of a policy to exploit
peasants at a maximal rate were the logical culmination of tendencies
already deeply embedded in the N.E.P.
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I. The Model
1. General Structure
The model has three types of agents-- peasants, workers, and the
party— and two different goods, money income and the agricultural good.
All wages and consumption goods are subsumed under money income y, which
serves as the numeraire. The agricultural good w is traded on the open
market at price p, which is supposed to fluctuate freely according to market
forces.
The society T equals [0,1], the unit interval. There is a continuum of
agents (P»l] and an atom at zero for the population measure y. y is the
Lebesgue measure on (P,!]. The atom at zero represents the party center.;
the continuum consists of peasants and workers. The income distribution y
is also continuous on (P,l]»
2. Peasants
Apeasant dt is represented by a utility function u^(x(t)) = x(t),
where x(t) dt is the money value of dt*s final allocation, and an endowment
(m(t), w(t)), representing dt*s cash and agricultural good holdings respec
tively. A peasant's initial income then is
y(t) = m(t) + pw(t).
The utility function expresses risk-neutrality; the model can be extended to
encompass substantial amounts of risk aversion.^ The distinction between
rich, middle, and poor peasants is expressed by differing levels of y(t).
Let P be the set of peasants, P C We assume
0 < }i(P) < 1.
Aggregate endowed peasant income, y(P)) satisfies
0 < y(P) = / py(t)dy.
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3. Workers
Aworker dt is represented by the utility function u^(x(t)) = x(t),
and the endowment y(t).
Let W be the entire set of workers. Then WUP = [0,1]. One has
0 < y(W) < 1, and y(W) + p(P) = 1-
For both peasants and workers, production has already taken place; the
remaining economic function is purely distributive.
4. The Party
The party consists of a center (the Central Committee or, more
narrowly, the Politburo) and a periphery, the party membership.
The party center is represented by the point 0 and is normalized to
have weight vi({0}) = 1. The party center has income endowment y({0}) = 0.
The party membership consists of workers and peasants and is represented by
the party membership measure The measure y is constant on P (respec
tively, W): each agent of a given class is assumed to have the same proba
bility of belonging to the party.
Control of the party means control of the state. A coalition which can
exercise control of the party is winning. A winning coalition must include
the party center, and a proportion ct of the membership,
0 <• a < 1.
The extreme values a = 0 and a » 1 represent dictatorship of the party
center and unanimity rule respectively. The complement of a winning coali
tion is losing. A coalition which is neither winning nor losing is indeci
sive. Examples of indecisive coalitions are {0} and PUW. P is losing if
vv(P) < ct, for then the complementary coalition {0}U W has the size required
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to win. The party center plays the role of a veto player: it never belongs
to a losing coalition.
The state is the chief purchaser of the agricultural good, which it
resells to workers. State purchases are financed by the taxes it collects.
The determination of the after-tax income distribution is the subject of the
succeeding two sections.
II. Game Theory and Power Struggle
In the Aumann-Kurz model of distribution,^ the major aspect of the
state is its tax policy. The state has unlimited tax powers: it can expro
priate whom it pleases. On the other hand, those subject to expropriation
can destroy their endowments and thus deprive their expropriators of their
loot. In a cooperative game, the tax system which emerges has somehow to
weigh the threats to expropriate and to escape expropriation in an overall
compromise.
A cooperative game (T,v) is a pair consisting of the set of players T
and coalition function v, which measures what each coalition can assure its
membersi There are cooperative games on two levels in the present model:
the purely political struggle for power, and the economic struggle over the
distribution of income.
The struggle for power is the easiest to describe. For SCT, the
coalition function Vj is given by
("1 if S is winning
Vi(S) =j
10 otherwise.
A coalition has the full state power if it is wining, and not otherwise.
This may seem to undervalue an indecisive coalition* One can also consider
the game dual to v^, v^, defined by v|(S) - Vj(T) - Vj(T/S). The dual power
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struggle game Is given by
"l if S is not losing
rfiS) =
0 otherwise.
Both these representations of the power struggle will prove useful.
The cooperative game concerning the distribution of income a
more complicated affair. Clearly, for the grand coalition T, ~ y(T).
Again, if S is indecisive, so is its countercoalition T/S. In this case,
the members of S can assure themselves of their own income and v^^CS) =
y(S). Now suppose S is winning and T/S is losing. If S and T/S carry out
their strongest threats, then S expropriates T/S and T/S destroys its entire
endowment. This yields an outcome to S and T/S of (y(S),0), respectively.
Consider this outcome as the disagreement point of the Nash bargaining
problem for dividing y(T) between S and T/S. The solution of the Nash
bargaining problem is
for S, 1/2 [y(T) + y(S)].
for T/S, 1/2 iy(T) - y(S)]. '
These are taken to be the coalition function values for S and T/S
respectively.
To summarize, for the income redistribution game, the coalition
function v^^ satisfies
1/2 [y(T) + y(S)] if S is wining
Vj.j.(S) = y(S) if S in indecisive
1/2 [y(T) - y(T/S)] if S is losing
It is also convenient to introduce a related cooperative game defined
by q(S)
y(S) if S is not losing
q(S) =
0 otherwise.
•9-
The relationship between and q is that
v^^-CS) = 1/2 [q(S) + q//(S)].
It is important to stress that in the cooperative game, threats to
expropriate or to destroy endowments are not actually carried out in the
final compromise. The situation would degenerate into noncooperative
behavior if such were the case. One reason to opt for a cooperative over a
noncooperative model is the fact that such threats are not carried out-
Ill. Power Distribution and Income Distribution
A widely accepted measure of political and economic power in a coopera
tive game is the Shapley value <|). The Shapley value has been given an
axiomatic foundation; in particular, it satisfies axioms of linearity,
symmetry, and Pareto efficiency.^ The Shapley value also satisfies the
random order interpretation: the Shapley value of a player t in a game v is
the expected marginal product of that player in a random ordering of all
players• Formally,
4,v(t) = E[v(S®) - v(S®/{t})]
where is the set of players up to and including t in a random order R on
the set of players, and E is the expectations operator when all random
orders on T are equally likely.
The Shapley value was originally defined for games with a finite number
of players. For the present situation, which has one large player and a
continuum of small players, Neyman has shown that there is an extension of
the Shapley value which continues to satisfy the symmetry and efficiency
axioms, and the random order interpretation.^
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We now turn to the Shapley value for the political power and income
distribution games.
Proposition The Shapley value of the power distribution game v^
satisfies
(f'Vj({0}) = 1-a
tf)V^(P) = av
(j)V^(W) = a(l-v)
Proof: By Shapiro and Shapley,^ the value of the atom in the a-quota game
is 1-a. By Keyman,^ the power of a coalition is propositional to its voting
size* Hence, the power of the peasants ({)V.(P) is proportional to v , and the
I
power of the workers <J)v(W) is proportional to By the efficiency axiom,
I
the proportionality constant is a.
Under the assumption of equal likelihood of party membership, these
Shapley values are uniformly spread over P and Wrespectively. An increase
in a, the quota needed to form a winning coalition, increases the power of
both workers and peasants and decreases that of the party center. On the
other hand, a decrease in a centralizes power. Further, an increase in a
class's party representation increases its power. Finally, we note that for
any game v, ^v = <J>v#, by reversing random orders. Thus, the power distribu
tion of proposition 1 also holds for the dual power game v|.
We now turn to 'the income distribution implied by the Shapley value of
the income redistribution game. This income distribution is intimately
connected with the distribution of power.
Proposition 2. The Shapley value ({i for the income distribution game v^^
is given by
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<^>^(^{0}) = ((l-ct)2/2)y(T)
K(dt) = [(I4a2)/2)y(t) + a(l-a)v(P)y(T)]dt, dt e P
(f.v(dt) = [(14a2)/2)y(t) + a(l-a)v(W)y(T)]dt, dt e W
II
Proof. By the linearity of the Shapley value, ~ (1/2) [(|>q +
Since = <j>q#, it suffices to compute ^iq.®
Consider first the atom 0. Denote by S the set of all agents up to and
including 0 in a random order of all agents. The value •J'qCO) is the expec
tation of the contribution q(S) - q(S/{0}) of 0 to S. Since the ordering is
random and there are many agents, S/{0} is a perfect sample of the ocean,
S/{0} = s(W P) for some s, 0 < s < 1. If y(S/{0}) < 1-a, then the contri
bution of the atom is q(S) = y(S) = sy(T). If (S/{0}) > 1-a, then the
contribution of the atom is zero. Hence, the expected contribution is
/J^sy(T)ds +/}_„Ods =((l=a)^/2)y(T).
Consider next an infinitesimal peasant dt of the ocean, S being a
random order as before- With probability 1/2, the atom is before dt in the
random ordering. In this event, dt's contribution to S is y(t) dt. With
probability 1/2, the atom is after dt in the ordering. The conditional
probability then is l-a^ that the coalition S is losing, in which case dt
contributes nothing, and that the coalition S is indecisive, in which
case dt*s marginal contribution is again y(t)dt. Finally, with probability
av(P), dt is pivotal. In this case, dt's marginal contribution is y(S) =
y((l-a)T), since y(S) = 1-a for dt to be pivotal. Summing up, dt
contributed nothing with probability (l-a)y(T) with probability
otv(P)dt, and y(t)dt with probability (l+a^)/2, so his expected marginal
contribution is
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= [(l-to2)/2)y(t) + a(l-a)v(p)y(T)]dt.
II
Similar reasoning, leads to the result for the worker.
It is useful to aggregate these results over sectors. Integrating, one
has
and
(|)v(P) = ((l-ta2)/2)y(P) + a(l-a)v(P)y(T)
II
^v(W) = ((14a2)/2)y(W) + o(l-a)v(W)y(T).
Note from these that as the peasant representation in the party falls,
so does the peasant share in the income distribution;
MP) = a(l-a)y(T) > 0.
A class's share in the income distribution is directly related to its parti
cipation in the party. As power centralizes, the effect on peasant Income
depends on
0v(P) = ay(S) + (l-2a)y(P)y(T).3a ji
This is definitely positive as long as a < 1/2; for a quite powerful party
center, increasing centralization decreases peasant income. For a > 1/2,
g
the sign of (}>v(P) is positive as long as
3a
g . v(P)y(T)
a-1 y(P)
In particular, if 1 < v(P)y(T)/y(P), then Increasing centralization
decreases peasant income for all a.
An alternative way of looking at shifts in the distribution of power is
in terms.of the net collection rate applied to coalition S, e(S),
,(S) =Z(S1_Z^
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When e(S) > 0, it represents the amount of income redistributed away from S
by the Shapley value compromise. For peasants P, the net collection rate
is
e(P) = (l-a)[(l+a)/2 - av(P)(y(T)/y(P))].
Just as an increase in party representation raises peasant income, it lowers
the collection rate. When increasing centralization decreases peasant
income, then it raises the collection rate.^
IV. Application to the N.E.P.
It may seem rather far-fetched to apply a formal model of game theory
to any period of Soviet history, let alone the N.E.P. Therefore, I shall
address in advance of a detailed application certain specific criticisms?
(1) Threat structure. In the period immediately preceding the N.E.P.
forced requisition and even expropriation of peasants' grain were acknow
ledged instruments of state policy. The peasant reaction included crop
destruction, failure to plant, and other forms of sabotage. These events
repeated themselves on a large scale after the demise of the N.E.P# To
ignore their possibility during the N.E.P. would be a serious oversight.
(2) Cooperative game. As Lenin repeatedly said, the basis of the
N.E.P. was the worker-peasant alliance. Coalitions such as this are what
distinguishes cooperative from noncooperative games. Marxian analysis in
terms of classes is likewise in accord with a coalitional framework.
(3) Political structure. This is probably the most controversial
aspect of the present model. Both Western and Soviet authorities are wont
to call the Soviet state a dictatorship, the only difference being whether
or not the epithet "of the proletariat" is appended. Ideological descrip
tions notwithstanding, the party center was not a dictator in the 1920s.
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This is not to deny that it wielded enormously greater power in the 1930s.
Party membership did have considerable meaning in terms of political power
in the 1920s- This helps explain the Lenin recruitment drives of 1924-5,
with their avowed aim of ringing the proportion of benchworkers in the
party up to 50%.^^ However, even if the broad structure is defensible, two
of its details are not. By treating the party center as an atom, a great
deal of strategic information is lost. There was substantial turnover in
the 1920s in the Politburo, for instance, with the expulsion of the
"leftists" in 1926 and of the "rightists" in 1929. The sole justification
for not modelling this is that it is adequately reflected in the society-
wide trends. Treating the probability of party membership as uniformly
distributed within classes is at best a simplification for computational
reasons. Characterizing the Shapley value would be much harder without this
assumption.
(4) Shapley value. The Shapley value has proved a useful approach to
questions of power and income distribution in a variety of games and
economies. In principle , there is no reason why the Shapley value should
not apply to a socialist economy, as long as it is properly modeled.
We how turn to data relevant to the N.E.P. The first series, from
Rigby,^^ gives the values of v during the N.E.P.:
Year
.-15-
Peasant Membership
1921 28.2
1922 26.7
1923 25.7
1924 28.8
1925 26.5
1926 25.9
1927 27.3
1928 22.9
1929 21.7
1930 20.2
One witnesses here a definite tendency for the peasant representation in the
party to fall, which is especially pronounced after 1927.
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In the N.E.P., where peasants constituted about 80% of the population,
the implied shift in power relative to the workers can be depicted by the
Lorentz curves of figure 1. In 1921, a representative worker was about
((l-v)/(y(w))/(v/y(P)) = 9.3 times as powerful as a representative peasant.
By 1930, this factor had risen to 16.
No explicit data on ct is available. A priori, one might be surprised
by values of a much different from one-half. Moreover, one has the impres
sion that the N.E.P. was a period of increasing centralization, especially
toward the end of the period.
On the economic side, Karcz^^ presents the following data on
centralized procurement of grain:
- 16 -
%Power
1921
% Population
FIGURE 1. Relative Distribution of Power, Workers and Peasants, 1921-19S0.
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Year Harvest Centralized
procurement
Rate of
procurement
(million tons) (million tons) (%)
1925 72.5 8.9 12.3
1926 76.8 11.6 15.2
1927 72.3 11.0 15.3
1928 73.3 10.8 14.7
1929 71.8 16.1 22.4
1930 83.5 22.1 26.5
Slnce data on cash balances and other taxes are not available, this is the
best proxy for the net collection rate for peasants e(P). This rate rose
rather dramatically by the end of the period.
Another useful piece of information is the reciprocal of the peasant
share in GNP, y(T)/y(P). Fortunately, this is available, thanks to Bergson,
for the year 1928, when GNP was 32.3 billion rubles, and income of Soviet
farmers was 10.8 billion rubles. This implies a value of the reciprocal of
about 3. Presumably, this ratio did not vary much over the N.E.P.
Figure 2 shows the scatter diagram of the collection rate e(P) against
the party membership ratio v. The negative relationship between these two
predicted by the Shapley value is quite evident. This latter interpretation
assumes, of course, that a and y(T)/y(P) are fairly stable. In the absence
of more information on these two variables, it is not possible to test
statistically the hypothesized relationship between e(P) and v. To proceed,
we shall assume that y(T)/y(P) is a constant == 3 throughout the period, and
that a is constant at some undetermined value. Fitting a straight line to
the equation
14
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e(P) = a + bv(P),
one has that a - .57 and b » -1.6. Although this gives a reasonably close
fit, it cannot be interpreted in terms of the underlying parameter a, since
neither
(l-a2)/2 " ,57
nor
-3o<l-a)x>(P) = -1.6
t.
has a real root between 0 and 1.
In light of the above result, one must explicitly recognize the nonlinear
estimation problem for a. A global search with the objective of minimizing
the sum of squared residuals leads to the estimate a".5.
If one examines the fitted line against the observations, it becomes
clear that the residuals are highly disturbed. In the period 1925-28, all
observations are below the fitted line; in the period 1929-30, above. Among
the possible responses to this result, two will be entertained here, both
involving possible changes in In the first, a is assigned a value of
.5 in 1928, and the worker share in political power is assumed to be constant
throughout the period 1925-1930. A value of a = .5 in 1928 appears to be
about in the center of the data. This hypothesis leads to the a series in
column (2):
e(P)
- 19 -
^est linear fit
x»observatlon
a".5 linear fit
\
v(P)
FIGURE 2. Scatter diagram of e(P) versus v(P)f 192S"1930«
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Year (Worker power constant) (Hypothesis 2)
1925 .52 .56
1926 .52 .54
1927 .53 .52
1928 .50 .50
1929 .49 .48
1930 .48 .46
Under the second hypotheses, a is again taken to be .5 in 1928, and assumed
to fall by 2% each year during 1925-1930, a mild centralizing tendency.
To see the effects of these two hypotheses, simulations are computed
and plotted against the realized values for the period 1925-1930. The simu
lations are carried back to 1921 for purposes of illustrations, ct assumed
constant and equal to its 1925 value for 1921-1924. Both hypotheses track
the observed series better than the constant -a equation. The second hypo
thesis tracks slightly better than the first, which suggests that overall
worker power may have eroded slightly in the period. Given the paucity of
data, however, neither hypothesis can be explored further here. Both hypo
theses reinforce the notion that peasant power fell significantly during the
period of the N.E.P., not just relative to workers by the party composition
effect, but also absolutely by centralization.
V. Aftermath of the N.E.P.
The N.E.P. came to an abrupt end in 1930, with the forced collectiviza
tion of peasants and liquidation of the rich peasant class. One witnessed a
return to forced grain collection, often without compensation, and a return
e
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to peasant sabotage, most strikingly in the destruction of livestock.
During the period 1931-33, the rate of grain collection rose to its highest
levels - .328, .266, and .330 respectively. These events culminated in
famine and the reinstatement of the collective farm market and small private
plots in 1933.
The present model helps to explain some of these events. It has argued
that, from the point of view of the Shapley value, the N.E.P. was a period
of falling political power on the part of the peasants, both relative to
workers and absolutely. There is some evidence for an increasing centrali
zation of power. With the defeat of the rightists at the end of 1929 and
the creation of a Stalin-dominated party center, these two tendencies con
verged. The peasants were by now sufficiently weak that a counter-coalition
could abandon the N.E.P. With their political defeat, the subsequent
economic sufferings of the peasants were inevitable. From the standpoint of
the game theory of power, the events of the early 1930s appear a logical
culmination of tendencies already working within the N.E.P.
All of this is not to say that the present model could be applied
directly to the Stalinist period, even if data were available.The
central modeling feature, that of cooperative game theory, would have to be
foregone. The carrying out of threats and concomitant social losses signal
the breakdown of the compromise that underlay the N.E.P. Only a noncoopera-
tive theory could do justice to these events. In addition, the strategic
meaning of collectivized peasants is much different from- that of autonomous
peasants, selling on the open market and paying a money tax. Again, the
^distinction between workers and employees, or between party and nonparty
members looms much larger in the 1930s than before. It is precisely for
these reasons that a different model applies to the aftermath of the N.E.P.
-23-
Appendix. A rigorous proof of Proposition 2
It follows from the result of Neyman [10] that q has an asymptotic
value. Hence, since all limiting values converge to the asymptotic value,
it suffices to compute a single limit.
Let S^, be disjoint coalitions with = 1/n andtJS^ =
XO, 1]. Let {0} be as before.
Let ^ random order of these coalitions.
We consider first the expected marginal contribution of {0} in a random
order.
With probability , {0} = in which event his marginal contribu
tion is 0. With probability , {0} = B^, in which case his marginal
contribution is y(B^). With probability , {0} = B^, in which case his
marginal contribution is y(B,) + y(B_) and so on until y(B,U ... U B ) >
1 z In
n - an, at which point ^ is not losing and {0} makes no further
contribution.
Since the order is random and for any i could be any of the S^,
E[y(B^)] =2 y(S.)
=-iy(T).
Hence, {0}'s expected marginal contribution is
1 ^ h ^ n - an
the error term arising when an is not an integer. In the limit as n->® ,
one has
-2A-
(n-an)(n-an+l) (1-a)^4.v^j({0}) - im—•
We now consider the expected marginal contribution of in a random
order.
With probability which cast its marginal contribution
is 0. With probability in which case = {0} with
probability and contributes y(S^) or {0} with probability
and contributes 0. Continuing this pattern, for h _< h - an, with
1 h-1probability , in which case LJ B^ ^ {0} with probability and
h-1
u
i-1
contributes y(S^) or with probability and contributes
h-1
0. For (l-a)n < h _< (l-a)n + 1, S. is pivotal when B. ^{0} and
^ i-1 ^ '
h n~h^2
contributes V-// y(B.) with probability—. Otherwise, for all h >
i=l ^ "
(l-a)n, = B^.with probability and contributes y(S^).
Summing up, S^'s expected marginal contribution is
1 , ^ y(S^) + y(S^) +1 a-„)ny(T)
1 _< h ^ (l-a)rH-l
+ o'(n).
The two expressions on the left are S^'s contributions when is not
2
pivotal; in the limit as n -> <», these amount to ^ y(dt). The next
expression is S^*s contribution when is pivotal. In the limit as n
is a peasant with probability ; here, the limit becomes
-25-
v(P)dt a(l-a) y(T).
The limit thus is
2
^ y(dt) + a(l-o)\>(P)y(T)dt for
approaching dt a peasant in the ocean, as was to be shown.
The same limit achieves the result for approaching dt a worker in
the ocean, the only difference being that Sj[^ is pivotal with probability
n-^W)
n+1 '
This completes the proof.
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FOOTNOTES
!• See Bettelheim [5], pp. 355-360 for details.
2. See Gardner [7] for details of this generalization.
3. See Aumann and Kurz [1,2] for a much expanded treatment.
4. Aumann and Shapley [3], Appendix A, presents this axiomatization, as
well as the random order interpretation of the Shapley value.
5. See Neyman [10], Theorem A.
6. Proved in Shapley and Shapiro [13], Theorem 1.
7. Neyman, cit.
8. The proof which follows is based on the main result in Gardner [7]. A
more rigorous proof is given in the appendix.
9. Their peasant collection rate is here measured in terms of money
income. Aumann and Kurz [2], Theorem B, shows that no generality is
lost by measuring this rate in terms of money income rather than in
terms of goods.
10. Rigby [12], p. 116 ff., discusses these drives. This goal was never
achieved.
11. Rigby, ££. cit., p. 116. Following Soviet sources., Rigby divides the
data into three classes: workers, peasants, and employees. For
present purposes, no generality is lost by aggregating workers and
employees. Concerning the quality of this data, Rigby says, "While the
precision of these percentages should not be exaggerated, being
distorted not only by error and misinformation, but also by changes of
classification, as we shall see below, they appear to-be accurate
enough to give a reliable impression of general trends." It is
r-n-
interesting to note that the Party Census for 1927 gives the peasant
membership figure of 19.0%, compared to 27«3% from the Great Soviet
Encyclopedia series.
12. For instance, [14], p. 654. This figures appears to have been fairly
stable over the period.
13. Karcz [8], p. 399, table 2, presents the figures for 1925-28. The
figures for 1929 and thereafter are from Nove [11], pages 180 and 186.
14. See Bergson [4], p. 154-56. By 1937, this reciprocal had risen to 5.7
[4, p. 118]. A higher y(T)/y(P) would lead to lower collection rates.
15. Ihis description of events closely follows Bettelheim [6], Lewin [9],
and Nove [11].
16. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia does not report class composition of the
party for 1931 or for 1933-1956. The figure for 1932, 26.5%, consists
entirely of collectivized peasants.
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